The question of whether the United States is building a surveillance state around the world is complex, involving a mix of historical context, technological advancements, policy decisions, and global implications. Based on available information, including recent analyses and historical precedents, here’s a critical examination of the issue.
Historical Context and Post-9/11 Expansion
The U.S. has significantly expanded its surveillance capabilities since the September 11, 2001 attacks, driven by national security concerns. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 marked a pivotal moment, granting the government sweeping powers to collect communications data, often without warrants. Programs like PRISM, revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, allowed the National Security Agency (NSA) to access data from tech giants like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, targeting both U.S. and non-U.S. persons. Additionally, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the growth of fusion centers have facilitated extensive data-sharing networks, both domestically and internationally.
The U.S. has also been a key player in the Five Eyes alliance (with the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), which operates a global surveillance network, including the ECHELON system, capable of intercepting telephone calls, emails, and other data worldwide. This alliance, rooted in the 1940s UKUSA Agreement, has expanded to include cooperation with “third-party” nations, amplifying its global reach. Reports indicate that the NSA has conducted surveillance on allies, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, causing diplomatic tensions.
Recent Developments
Since 2020, the U.S. has invested heavily in surveillance technologies, particularly for immigration enforcement. The New York Times reported that the federal government has spent $7.8 billion on immigration-related technologies, partnering with 263 companies to deploy tools like facial recognition drones, biometric data collection, and license plate readers. The Department of Homeland Security’s use of AI-based systems and software from companies like Cellebrite and NSO Group (developers of Pegasus spyware) has raised concerns about warrantless monitoring, particularly targeting immigrants but with broader implications.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency has been described as a “domestic surveillance agency,” spending $2.8 billion from 2008 to 2021 on data collection, accessing utility records of over 218 million customers across the U.S. without judicial oversight. This suggests a domestic surveillance infrastructure that could be adapted for broader use. Additionally, programs like “Catch and Revoke,” launched in 2025, use AI to scrape social media for visa revocations, targeting individuals based on their online activity, such as protests.
Globally, the U.S. has been accused of extending its surveillance through data-sharing agreements and technological exports. Posts on X and some reports claim the U.S. encourages or pressures other nations to adopt digital ID and biometric systems, facilitating data access through covert agreements. For example, the U.S. has been linked to surveillance in Bahrain, where NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware was used to target activists, allegedly with U.S. involvement.
Counterarguments and Oversight
Some argue that U.S. surveillance is not about building a global “surveillance state” but rather a necessary response to terrorism, cyber threats, and geopolitical competition. The NSA and other agencies justify mass surveillance as critical for national security, citing the need to prevent attacks like 9/11. The USA Freedom Act of 2015 introduced some restraints, such as limiting bulk data collection, and the U.S. system remains subject to democratic oversight through Congress and the courts, unlike authoritarian surveillance models.
However, critics point out that oversight is often inadequate. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) has been criticized for approving surveillance programs behind closed doors, and “backdoor searches” under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act allow the FBI and CIA to access Americans’ communications without warrants. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board has noted thousands of non-compliant searches, particularly targeting marginalized groups like Muslims, immigrants, and racial justice protesters.
Global Implications
The U.S. surveillance apparatus has global reach, but it’s not the only player. China, for instance, has exported surveillance technology to over 80 countries, often to authoritarian regimes, raising concerns about a competing model of surveillance. The U.S. has criticized China’s systems while simultaneously expanding its own, leading to accusations of hypocrisy. The U.S.’s collaboration with private tech companies and data brokers creates a “surveillance capitalism” model that some argue is just as invasive as state-driven systems, with fewer accountability mechanisms.
Critical Perspective
While the U.S. has not explicitly set out to build a global surveillance state, its actions—through legislative frameworks, technological investments, and international partnerships—have created a vast, interconnected surveillance infrastructure. This system disproportionately affects vulnerable populations (e.g., immigrants, minorities, and activists) and erodes privacy rights globally, often without sufficient oversight. The reliance on private companies and data brokers, combined with legal loopholes, allows the government to bypass constitutional protections, raising concerns about an “information tyranny.” However, the U.S.’s democratic framework and public debates, spurred by whistleblowers like Snowden, provide some avenues for reform, unlike in fully authoritarian states.
Conclusion
The U.S. is not “building” a surveillance state in the sense of a centralized, authoritarian system, but it has developed a sophisticated, tech-driven surveillance architecture with global reach. This system, rooted in post-9/11 policies and amplified by recent technological advancements, operates through domestic programs, international alliances, and private-sector partnerships. While justified as a national security necessity, it risks enabling unchecked power, both domestically and abroad, particularly when used against marginalized groups or allies. Ongoing debates and potential reforms, such as those surrounding Section 702, offer opportunities to address these concerns, but the trajectory suggests a deepening entrenchment of surveillance capabilities.
For further details on specific programs or policies, you can explore sources like the ACLU’s reports on Section 702 (https://www.aclu.org) or Georgetown University’s “American Dragnet” report (https://www.law.georgetown.edu).